Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction

Nuclear & Radiological Security

Terrorists are actively seeking radiological and nuclear weapons and materials to commit acts of nuclear terrorism. Since the early 1990s, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has received reports of over confirming 3000 security incidents with nuclear and radiological materials.

The Global Partnership Nuclear & Radiological Security Working Group

 

A single act of nuclear or radiological terrorism would have catastrophic humanitarian, political, environmental and economic consequences on a global scale.

Terrorists are known to be actively seeking weapons and materials for use in a radiological or nuclear terrorist attack. Since the early 1990s, the IAEA has received voluntary reporting from its Member States confirming over 3000 incidents with nuclear and radiological materials. This includes over 450 incidents of smuggling or unauthorized possession, and over 700 incidents involving theft or loss of such material.

It is a crucial undertaking to secure radiological and nuclear materials worldwide but the capacity to prevent trafficking of radiological and nuclear materials remains inadequate. Futhermore, new and increasingly sophisticated threats are emerging, such as cyber threats to nuclear facilities.

The Nuclear and Radiological Working Group (NRSWG) is an informal working group guided by the following principles:

Enhancing Global Nuclear & Radiological Security

THEMATIC AREAS INCLUDE:

  • Physical Protection measures at facilities housing nuclear and other radioactive material

  • Radiological source security (whole-of-life management)

  • Prevention of illicit trafficking as well as detection and response to material outside regulatory control

  • Nuclear Security Culture including training and Nuclear Security Training and Support Centres

  • International legal frameworks related to nuclear security

  • Nuclear Forensics

  • Information and Computer Security

  • Transportation Security

  • Disposition and Conversion of nuclear materials

NRSWG Chair

United States
Maegon Barlow

Canada
Nathalie Semblat

  • To be an effective tool for "match-making" - bringing together resources with identified requirements and facilitating new partnerships to deliver work in new priority areas;
  • To implement the Action Plan in support of the Global Partnership  agreed during the 2016 Nuclear Security Summit (NSS), and other relevant commitments arising from the NSS Process;
  • To complement the work of other organizations and initiatives working in this field including but not limited to the IAEA (Working Group on Radioactive Sources Security, Nuclear Security Training and Support Centres), INTERPOL (Radiological and Nuclear Terrorism Prevention Unit), Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, Border Monitoring Working Group;
  • To focus on implementa"tion and facilitation of partnerships at the programmatic level on nuclear and radiological security  thematic areas and priorities;

The NRSWG is using a virtual platform to support both real time and asynchronistic meetings/dialogues and facilitate collaboration between NRSWG members.  Please visit the main page of the portal to request access. NRSWG partners also support the Information Sharing Initiative on Nuclear and Radiological Security projects in Ukraine as outlined in the Cooperative Framework agreed in October 2018.

Match-Making Lead